Australia-Korea: Sixty years of benign neglect

2021 celebrates sixty years of the Australia-Korea diplomatic relationship – sixty years of benign neglect in which the relationship has prospered despite a lack of attention.

First, in measures commonly used to assess bilateral relationships, the relationship is successful. In political, economic, and security terms, there’s ample evidence: an acceptable number of high-level political visits, a mutually beneficial trade relationship, and growing cooperation in defence and intelligence. This is marked by a number of key diplomatic achievements: MIKTA, the Korea Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA), the MOU on Development Cooperation, the Foreign and Defence Ministers’ (“2+2”) meetings, and a “strategic partnership”. Each achievement ticks the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) boxes in foreign ministry annual reports. However, at a deeper level these same indicators gloss over underlying weaknesses.

Second, the relationship is not as strong as it should be. With all due respect to Australia’s hardworking diplomats, success in the relationship doesn’t result from focused effort. The relationship is more borne of circumstance and luck than anything else: compatibility as middle power liberal democracies, mutual trade compatibility, and compatibility within the US alliance framework. The relationship could be much stronger. 

As middle powers with divergent economic and security interests balanced between Beijing and Washington, the two states should have much to discuss. In South Korea, strategic dialogue regularly questions the utility of the US alliance, relations with China, an independent nuclear weapons capability, and even armed neutrality. Dialogue undertaken for a day or two at an academic or thinktank conference hardly scratches the surface – and strategic affairs is just one topic. There are lessons to be learned from each other on energy, climate, immigration, population, e-governance, gender, public health, and every area of governance and regulation.

Third, the Australia-Korea bilateral relationship is not a priority. In both countries, there is a distinct lack of interest.

In Australia, it’s rare to see Korea on TV outside the usual North Korea routines (the recent deployment of an ABC correspondent to Seoul is a welcome exception – save for the awkward pronunciation of Korean names!). Most of Australia’s commentators are still defence or strategic studies specialists treating Korea as a headline-grabbing sideline, or at best China or Japan specialists spreading themselves to reach a wider audience. Australia also remains far behind the US, UK, and Canada in recognition and consumption of Korean culture. Significantly, with Korean studies programs at several Australian universities under threat, it’s increasingly difficult for students to commit to research programs on Korea.

In Korea, there’s even less interest in Australia. Just over twenty years ago a DFAT sponsored study pointed out that to most Koreans, Australia was a beach, a mine, and a place to learn English. Nothing has changed. Australia remains an afterthought as evidenced by the array of texts in libraries and bookshops. There are books on holidays, working holidays, migration, and little else. Most research on Australia is undertaken by academics with a connection to Australia – all too often as a natural and understandable means to undertake research in an ideal holiday destination.

Fourth, the narratives used to frame the relationship are inadequate. In a recent study, I investigated G20 member embassy website, promotional material, and ambassadorial relationship narratives. I tested them for effectiveness on students studying in the fields of international relations and public administration at Korea’s top universities with plans to enter the public service. Australia’s narratives were largely ineffective. They were either considered bland and meaningless or confused with other countries. There’s more that Australia could do to promote itself to a Korean audience.

Fifth and last, if we were to apportion any blame on the current state of the relationship, I’d argue it’s largely an Australian problem. As most Australian students and academics would be aware, there are rewards for making Korea your focus. Despite threats to existing programs, there are currently ample courses, even majors, to pursue; scholarships for language study or research; and well-respected and globally recognized academics to study under. There are careers to pursue in Korea, and as always, Korea remains important in an international relations and strategic studies context.

In Korea, there are no rewards for making Australia your focus – or rather, it’s impossible to make Australia your focus. In major universities you cannot find a single course that focuses on Australia. The only Australian studies centre in Korea consists of one academic with a Facebook page attracting scant media interest. Canberra needs to invest in Australian studies in Korea.

Education builds long-term relationships. Students studying a country and its region year after year make an investment of time, money and effort. Ultimately, some of them will become government and business leaders who see Australia as an ideal partner, rather than merely a beach, a mine, or a good place to study English. Parliamentary groups, business groups, professional groups and others may sustain relationships, but it’s cohorts of students developing skills and profiles that stay with them throughout their careers that build bilateral relationships.

As published 1 November 2021 at Korea Research Center. 

Media: Flikr Commons

Australia, South Korea, Bilateral Relations, Australia-Korea