On 18 August 2023 Biden, Yoon and Kishida met at Camp David. The meeting attracted global attention, and was heralded by President Biden as “a new era in partnership” between the three states. I argue that the meeting’s significance will ultimately prove to not be its outcomes, but rather the misplaced expectations it generates
Camp David expectations
In a diplomatic context, the choice of Camp David was highly significant. A presidential retreat situated in the relatively remote woods of Maryland, meetings at Camp David have historically symbolized a distancing from the day to day, in order to consider the longer-term. With an eye on his domestic audience, Yoon effusively accorded the meeting a significance to match the location:
“From this moment on, Camp David will be remembered as a historic place where the Republic of Korea, the United States, and Japan proclaimed that we will bolster the rules-based international order and play key roles to enhance regional security and prosperity based on our shared values of freedom, human rights, and rule of law.”
For all the effusive acclamation, the outcomes were somewhat less impressive - more military exercises, a crisis communications hotline (as if an effective means of communication doesn’t already exist), and the hosting of trilateral summits. Institutionalization? Perhaps. Historical? Not necessarily. Permanent? Definitely not. In the historical context of three states which have for want of a better phrasing “been coordinated” by the United States to act together in contingencies since the Korean War, the outcomes do not match the setting. Indeed, they cheapen the setting.
Camp David hosted Roosevelt and Churchill in the middle of the Second World War, and Eisenhower and Kruschev at the height of the Cold War. It hosted Carter, Sadat and Begin as well as Clinton, Barak and Arafat in the pursuit of Middle East peace. On each occasion, the gravity of talks and their ultimate outcomes constituted historical turning points. On the third weekend of August 2023, Camp David was a stage which outshone both the actors and their performance. Consistent with Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the Camp David talks produced more rhetoric than substance.
The mismatch between outcomes and setting should act as a warning on misplaced expectations regarding South Korea’s Indo-Pacific future. A trilateral summit at Camp David should have been the crowning achievement of the Yoon Administration. There’s a possibility that it may later be viewed as a turning point. The Yoon Administration’s foreign policy strategy is not sustainable in the long term.
Reasons to question South Korea’s Indo-Pacific future
For many in Washington’s foreign policy establishment, the election of Yoon took on near spiritual overtones - a ‘prodigal son’ returning South Korea to the embrace of the US alliance framework. The Yoon Administration’s two guiding strategic documents, the Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region and the National Security Strategy: Global Pivotal State for Freedom, Peace and Prosperity reinforced this sentiment. There are reasons however to question South Korea’s Indo-Pacific future.
First, there is a gap between foreign policy rhetoric and action. Its foreign policy rhetoric is loaded with terms ensconced in the American foreign policy psyche - freedom, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. However, its foreign policy actions are understandably more guarded and careful, essentially maintaining a trajectory not dissimilar to the previous administration - diversification of economic, strategic, and diplomatic partners; balancing the demands of China and the US; and seeking to increase its capacity to act independently. The gap between foreign policy rhetoric and action has the potential to increase misunderstanding and will be difficult to continue.
Second, the close association of the Indo-Pacific Strategy with the Yoon Administration does not augur well for sustainability. The cover page of the strategy document explicitly states that it is “The Yoon Suk Yeol Administration’s” national security strategy. The title implies it is not necessarily South Korea’s national security strategy, but rather an administration’s strategy. A simple word count on the use of the president’s name serves as a rough contrast. South Korea’s national security strategy mentions Yoon 121 times (aided by a running footer reminding the reader of the Yoon Administration’s ownership. The U.S. national security strategy mentions Biden just 5 times. While the U.S. National Security strategy utilizes quotes from the President to reiterate points, its emphasis is on “the people” and the “the nation” rather than the individual currently holding the office. This is a glaring difference and needs to be remembered in the context of foreign policy continuity between South Korea’s presidential administrations.
Third, the rapidly changing strategic environment marked by uncertainty regarding China and its intentions, increased US-China competition, and particularly significant US elections in 2024, mean that the current strategy of most regional states will inevitably be revised at increasingly shorter intervals - for South Korea, perhaps even within the term of the Yoon Administration.
A middle power explanation?
A more powerful reason to question South Korea’s Indo-Pacific future may rest in middle power theory. That South Korea is a middle power is widely accepted. Indeed, to question this invites ridicule. Yet, South Korea has always been somewhat of an outlier leading some to question its status. This can be explained through an exploration of the modern middle power concept.
The modern term “middle power” is an historically embedded neologism – a new term created to address a specific set of contemporary circumstances. Its lexicographic journey commenced with Canadian and later Australian officials to distinguish their nations as deserving of a more prominent role in post-war global governance with the formation of the United Nations. Over time it developed different meanings as academics wrestled with its import, ultimately settling with a distinct grouping of states that were largely Western, stable liberal market democracies, fundamentally satisfied with the status quo, allied to the U.S. and the international order it supported. From here, the middle power secured an inherent association with multilateralism, rule of law, nuclear non-proliferation, environmentalism, peace-keeping, and human rights.
The modern middle power was a distinct grouping of states very much associated with the international order in which they flourished. Secondary powers have existed throughout history, but the modern middle power existed only between the 1940s and the early 2000s. The middle power moment is over. This explains South Korea’s outlier status. As a late (or perhaps the last entrant) to the middle power grouping, South Korea does not share the same depth of commitment to the core middle power characteristic values multilateralism, rule of law, nuclear non-proliferation, environmentalism, peace-keeping, and human rights. It does however share the characteristics of secondary powers throughout history.
South Korea holds three long-term foreign policy aims: First, the defense of the nation and the security of its citizens. Second, the maintenance of prosperity and economic well-being. Last, the pursuit of a capacity to support independent action. As a rising secondary power (and divided state), South Korea is not wed to the current status quo. In the long-term, it will not necessarily be wed to the wider U.S.-led Indo-Pacific vision, the U.S.-led non-proliferation regime, nor (controversially) the U.S. alliance structure network.
The hopes of stability and predictability are not assured in the region. Nor are they assured in South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy. In a worst case scenario, the Camp David trilateral summit may ultimately be significant not as the beginning of a new era, but rather as a point marking the end of an old era.
Media: Office of the President, ROK