South Korea, Ukraine, and Yoon’s foreign policy failure
Yoon's foreign policy failures increase South Korea's risk profile in economic and national security terms.
North Korea has increased its cooperation with Russia and will now potentially either directly or indirectly support Russia’s war in the Ukraine.
This puts the Yoon Administration in a quandary. South Korea must make a decision on increasing its support for Ukraine, and ending its self-imposed restriction on the donation of lethal weapons to Ukraine.
Cornered by rhetoric?
Since coming to power, Yoon has promoted South Korea as a ‘global pivotal state’, expressed the administration’s support for freedom, democracy, and rule of law, and integrated South Korea into the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific framework.
This foreign policy position is values-centered, built on conservative, liberal-democratic values. It is a natural assumption that any state holding these values would support a “fellow” liberal-democratic state invaded by an authoritarian state.
Comparisons include Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany who all, to varying degrees and at varying speeds of implementation, have supported Ukraine by donating lethal weapons to support its defense. Historical comparisons also include the defense of South Korea when North Korea invaded.
Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. The Moon Administration (May 2017 - May 2022) chose to not support Ukraine. The rationale for the Moon Administration’s decision to not provide support was economic (desire to maintain bilateral trade with Russia) and security (desire to maintain focus on North Korea).
On coming to power, the Yoon Administration did not change this policy. It has continued to sustain this policy, marking an increasing gap between the liberal democratic rhetoric and its policy action.
The failure to act
Over time, this decision to not support Ukraine became more difficult to sustain as:
Other states increased support;
South Korea further promoted itself as a ‘global pivotal state’ supporting freedom, democracy, and rule of law; and
South Korea commenced selling lethal weapons to states that donate them to Ukraine (and on occasions sought to promote this as direct support).
Other states have noted this hypocrisy. During bilateral interaction with partner states and multilateral interaction at NATO and U.S.-led fora, partners have emphasized that South Korea should donate to Ukraine rather than sell to those who donate.
The failure to follow through on its rhetoric and immediately change the Moon Administration’s policy, placed the Yoon Administration in a difficult situation. Postponing policy action as other states changed their policies in the hope of avoiding a disruption to trade has now led to a decidedly more difficult situation - a quandary.
The quandary
The U.S. presidential elections will be decided in less than three weeks. At the moment, it is likely that there will be a Trump victory.
While any prediction must be considered within the context of egocentricity and spontaneity, at the moment it appears that Trump will substantially reduce support for Ukraine and potentially force Ukraine to negotiate an end to the conflict.
As noted, North Korea has increased its cooperation with Russia and will now potentially either directly or indirectly support Russia’s war in the Ukraine. This substantially increases pressure on South Korea to increase support for Ukraine, and end its self-imposed restriction on the donation of lethal weapons.
However, a South Korean decision to increase support for Ukraine, and end its self-imposed restriction on the donation of lethal weapons, at this stage will potentially lead to:
Immediate loss of bilateral trade with Russia (economic risk); and
Increased potential for Korean Peninsula conflict (national security risk).
Yoon’s two foreign policy failures are thus coming together over the next three weeks. Yoon (1) failed to create and sustain a workable North Korea policy; and (2) failed to ensure rhetoric matches policy action.
Future studies will need to investigate whether Yoon’s foreign policy was (a) simply a failure or (b) a more conniving rhetorical ploy to ingratiate the administration with liberal-democratic states as the democratic/authoritarian divide widens.
Either way, the immediate result is a foreign policy that increases South Korea’s risk in economic and national security terms.
Image: ROK Office of the President