Australia and Korea: nuclear subs and sovereignty
South Korea and Australia are pursuing nuclear-powered submarines at roughly the same historical moment, yet they are doing so with very different philosophical approaches.
South Korea and Australia are pursuing nuclear-powered submarines at roughly the same historical moment, yet they are doing so with very different philosophical and strategic approaches.
For Seoul, the nuclear submarine program has become a symbol of strategic adulthood. It’s described as a “symbol of commitment to self-reliant defense,” and is central to the long-term commitment for “self-reliant national defense.” Seoul is not standing still amid growing uncertainty in the international system. The South Korean vision is not alliance rejection, but it is alliance hedging. The objective is to ensure that if the alliance weakens, changes, or becomes distracted, South Korea can still survive independently.
This is why there is no debate in South Korea for a Plan B, Plan C, or Plan D. The submarine itself is the plan: indigenous capability, domestic shipbuilding, domestic nuclear expertise, and an increasingly autonomous defense posture. Seoul aims to build the boats domestically and fuel them using low-enriched uranium while leveraging its own advanced industrial base. Even negotiations with Washington are framed around expanding Korean capability rather than embedding Korea permanently into an American command structure.
Strategically, this reflects a classical realist logic. South Korea increasingly assumes that great powers become unreliable under systemic stress. Extended deterrence will weaken. American priorities may shift. The threats of Trump or a similar Trump-like future president upping and leaving will always be there. Alliances are conditional. Survival depends upon retaining national agency.
Australia, by contrast, has gone in the opposite direction with AUKUS.
Canberra is not building a pathway toward autonomy. It is institutionalizing dependency. The entire AUKUS structure rests on deep integration with American strategy, American industrial timelines, American technology controls, American operational doctrine, and ultimately American geopolitical priorities. Even advocates openly frame AUKUS as part of a broader coalition designed to preserve U.S. primacy in the Indo-Pacific.
This is why Australia constantly requires backup plans. AUKUS was in the first instance - a backup plan. Virginia-class submarines - another backup plan. Collins-class extensions - another backup plan. Add to that alternative basing arrangements, industrial bottlenecks, and submarine shortfalls and the debate itself reveals the deeper structural reality: Australia’s submarine future is not sovereign. Australia is not seeking to control its strategic future. It has handed it over to Washington at a point which any sane person would clearly say is the worst time in history.
The difference in the national debates demonstrates the difference between the Korean and Australian philosophical approaches and strategic trajectories. South Korea’s submarine debate is about independence, self-reliance, and strategic self-strengthening. Australia’s submarine debate demonstrates a lack of confidence, a desire to be a junior partner, and ultimately about strategic alliance management.
South Korea is ensuring it can act alone if necessary. Australia is constructing a future in which acting alone is impossible.
One approach seeks autonomy within an alliance. The other sacrifices autonomy to preserve an alliance. Therein lies the real difference between the two submarine programs. South Korea sees nuclear submarines as insurance against dependency. Australia sees nuclear submarines as a way to lock itself into dependency.
The contrast also reflects two different understandings of middle-power survival.
Seoul behaves like a state that assumes the international order can fracture and that alliances can be unreliable. Its response is to maximize national resilience, indigenous capability, and strategic flexibility. It is preparing itself to dynamically fit within whichever international order prevails in the future.
Canberra behaves like a state that assumes survival will always occur inside an American-led system. Its response is to bind itself so deeply into U.S. military architecture that disentanglement becomes politically, economically, technologically, and strategically impossible. It is preparing itself to be a holdout to an international order that has passed.
In the end, only one of them will actually get their submarines. Australia’s marched through Australian-built, French built, Japanese-built, and now US-UK sort of, we’ll see how we go -built submarines. Seoul will stick to its schedule and will have submarines in the water in the 2030s. Australia currently aims for a hop-potch, mix ‘n’ match of refurbished Collins Class submarines, some borrowed but not completely sovereign Virginia Class submarines, and then maybe, just maybe, some time in 2040s, an AUKUS Class submarine. My bet is, Australia will end up buying South Korean nuclear subs.