International relations theory fails middle powers

Middle powers do not exist in an anarchic system! They cannot—the very term “middle power” presupposes hierarchy.

Structural realism begins from a simple premise: the international system is anarchic—there is no world government above states, states must ultimately rely upon themselves for survival. In such an environment, power becomes the essential currency of security. Structure matters more than morality, ideology, or leadership personalities because the system constrains behavior regardless of intent.

This logic works remarkably well when applied to great powers.

The United States cannot depend upon another state to guarantee its survival. China cannot outsource its security. Russia cannot place its faith in international institutions. Great powers exist in a genuinely anarchic environment because no superior authority exists capable of protecting them from existential threats.

But this is precisely where the problem begins for middle power theory. Middle powers do not exist in an anarchic system! They cannot—the very term “middle power” presupposes hierarchy.

A “middle” power only exists relative to larger powers that dominate the surrounding order. The category itself assumes a structured international environment in which rules, norms, trade routes, reserve currencies, alliance systems, and security guarantees are shaped by stronger states.

In this sense, middle powers are not products of anarchy. They are products of hegemony. The assumption of the system and its structure is not anarchy but hegemony or at least hierarchy.

This is the conceptual contradiction sitting quietly at the center of decades of International Relations scholarship. International relations theory was NOT built around middle powers. It fails to explain or predict middle power behavior.

Structural realism describes a world of self-help under anarchy. Yet modern middle power theory emerged almost entirely within a U.S.-led hegemonic order where self-help was partially outsourced upward to American power.

Australia did not patrol the sea lanes that sustained its economy. Canada did not independently stabilize the global financial system. Germany and Japan dramatically reduced military burdens precisely because American power underwrote their strategic environment. South Korea existed beneath an American nuclear umbrella. The so-called rules-based order rested not upon abstract rules, but upon the material dominance of the United States.

Middle powers occupy a fundamentally different structural position from great powers. Great powers shape systems. Middle powers operate within systems already shaped by others.

This is why the language surrounding middle powers during the 1990s today feels strangely detached from the assumptions of structural realism itself. Structural realism begins with insecurity and survival. Middle power discourse often began with cooperation, legitimacy, and multilateralism.

The difference is structural. Middle powers do not confront the international system directly. They confront it through hegemonic mediation.

Their security environment is filtered through alliance systems, institutional frameworks, trade regimes, and strategic guarantees constructed by larger powers. Their room for maneuver depends not upon escaping hierarchy, but upon positioning themselves effectively within it.

Even so-called “strategic autonomy” usually occurs within hegemonic space rather than outside it.

Waltz’s system is anarchic because no higher authority exists above great powers. But middle powers always exist beneath somebody’s structural dominance. Their strategic calculations are therefore shaped less by pure self-help and more by negotiating proximity to hegemonic power.

Middle powers are never fully outside hierarchy.

Once a state truly escapes hegemonic dependence and possesses the capability to secure itself independently, it ceases to be a middle power in any meaningful sense.

This also explains why middle powers become so anxious during periods of hegemonic transition.

Their fear is not primarily the return of anarchy. They never existed outside hierarchy to begin with. Their fear is uncertainty over which hegemonic structure will dominate the future order and what position they will occupy within it.

For great powers, polarity defines the system. For middle powers, hegemonic orientation defines the system. That distinction is critical.

The strategic dilemmas of Australia, South Korea, and Canada are not fundamentally about surviving an anarchic world alone. They are about managing dependence within shifting hegemonic environments. Their central questions are therefore different from those of great powers:

Which hegemon secures trade? Which hegemon guarantees maritime access? Which hegemon controls technological standards? Which hegemon sets financial rules? Which hegemon punishes deviation? Which hegemon can still enforce order?

These are not anarchic questions. They are hierarchical questions.

Mearsheimer’s offensive realism argues that states seek to maximize power because survival can never be guaranteed. That logic may hold for great powers. But middle powers cannot seek regional hegemony themselves because their strategic existence depends upon operating within broader hegemonic systems they cannot independently replace.

This suggests that at extremes, the structures in which middle powers exist can be distinct. At the extremes, Canada does not exist in an anarchic system—it exists within an American hegemonic system under pressure from China. At the extremes, Australia does not exist in an anarchic system—it exists between the American and Chinese hegemonic systems. At the extremes, South Korea does not exist in an anarchic system—it exists within a Chinese hegemonic system under pressure from America. Middle powers do not exist in anarchic systems.

The challenge for many contemporary researchers and policymakers in middle power countries is that they speak the language of international relations as taught in the United States. They think and speak like great powers - anarchy, power, balance, deterrence. The problem is, they are not great powers. Middle powers must focus on hierarchy, adaptability, access, and influence - fundamentally different set of priorities to great powers.

Middle powers do not exist in an anarchic system. We need theory that takes this into consideration when building its assumptions. Until then, international relations theory fails middle powers.

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