Koreas policy in the age of narcissism
Agree or disagree with think-tank policy proposals - it doesn’t matter. They will be ignored.
It is a strange time to be a thinktank policy analyst in Washington. On one hand, the policy papers keep coming—well-researched, sober, often sensible attempts to offer realistic paths forward on North Korea and the ROKUS alliance. On the other hand, none of it matters. There’s a president who derides experts and only wants photo ops and an ATM.
This week has seen the release of two detailed policy papers by leading U.S. thinktanks.
The Quincy Institute’s recent essay, “Trump Could Get a Win With North Korea” propose that Trump could take a more modest, flexible approach toward North Korea, focusing on limited concessions and incremental progress.
The Carnegie Endowment’s comprehensive “Pursuing Stable Coexistence” outlines a detailed reorientation of U.S. North Korea policy—one that shifts away from the doomed all-or-nothing denuclearization demand and toward a more pragmatic framework of arms control, diplomacy, and risk reduction.
Both are thoughtful. Both are grounded in political realism. Both are written by people I respect and admire. Agree or disagree with the ideas - it doesn’t matter. Both are doomed to be ignored.
Why? Because these proposals assume the presence of a rational policymaking process. They operate in a world where strategy is driven by deliberation, not dopamine. They imagine a president who reads memos, values interagency input, and prioritizes outcomes over optics. In short, they make the mistake of assuming that American foreign policy is still shaped by policy.