Middle powers, values, and interests

Values-based relationships were a luxury of a brief historical moment rather than a permanent feature of international politics.

I’ve been accused of being anti-American and I’ve been accused of being anti-Chinese. I’ve also been accused of being a self-serving, greedy, pizza hog. I can’t really defend the last, so instead I’ll add fuel to the fire on the first two with the question: do middle powers prosper with values-based or interests-based relationships?

Values-based relationships seem natural for the middle powers of liberal international order. During the post-Cold War period they were pushed to describe alliances primarily in moral language—“shared democratic values,” “rules-based order,” “like-minded partners.” It became natural to think of alliances as building blocs for shared political systems, economic models, civilizational identities, and even social values.

For many Australians and Canadians in particular, describing alliances primarily in values-based language, is natural. With a relatively short and easy transition between accepting British and then American dominance, values were an easy narrative foundation on which to build a lasting relationship.

For others, it has been somewhat harder, and a more recent and sometimes difficult step. South Korea under Park Chung-hee and later military governments was authoritarian, developmentalist, and heavily state-directed economically. The U.S. alliance was then driven primarily by anti-communism and deterrence against North Korea—not liberal democratic convergence. “Shared democratic values,” “rules-based order,” “like-minded partners” have been a relatively recent addition.

The momentous growth in values-based narratives reflected an inherent recognition that interests-based narratives no longer cut it.

First, values-based narratives started to be more prominent in the post-Cold War period when the threats upon which interest-based narrative were built, essentially disappeared. Second, the realization that China had emerged as a competitor to the United States, and an important customer to its allies, necessitated something to define, distinguish, and ultimately distance China from U.S. alliance partners. Lastly, in strategic terms, value-based narratives allow a broader net to draw in less dedicated partners, such as the efforts to draw in India to support an Indo-Pacific collective of “democratic” states.

It’s fair to say this all changed with the Trump transaction. Values became more cynically frame and interests came to the fore.

Interests-based relationships possess advantages that values-based relationships lack: clarity, flexibility, and strategic honesty. They acknowledge openly that states cooperate because they derive tangible benefits from doing so, whether security guarantees, market access, technology transfers, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic support.

Interests-based relationships can survive enormous cultural and ideological differences precisely because they are not dependent on emotional narratives of civilizational unity. They provide middle powers with greater room to maneuver. A state operating through interests can deepen security cooperation with one power while maintaining economic engagement with another without constantly needing to frame every interaction in moral terms.

Historically, many successful middle powers prospered through precisely this form of pragmatic balancing. Their diplomacy was transactional, adaptive, and often ambiguous. The danger, of course, is that interests-based relationships can feel colder and less stable. Great powers pursuing interests may rapidly reassess commitments when costs rise or strategic priorities shift. Yet this may simply reflect the reality of international politics more honestly than the comforting but often fragile language of shared values.

A telling contemporary example is of course Iran and its relationship China and Russia. Though not alliances, the highly impactful relationship between Iran and China, and between Iran and Russia, or even between China and Russia, require absolutely no justification with shared political systems, economic models, civilizational identities, and even social values.

Have you ever seen or heard Russian, Chinese, or Iranian media talk about the relationship, let alone talk about it in terms of shared values? No! Because there is no need. It’s a practical, immediately important, and utilitarian relationship based squarely on a convergence of interests.

So where does this leave the likes of Australia, Canada and South Korea?

For Australia, the challenge is deeply psychological. Its strategic culture has long assumed that security and identity flow together. Britain was once the civilizational parent; the United States became the broader Anglosphere protector. Yet Australia’s economic future naturally lies in Asia, especially China. The stronger Canberra leans into values-based rhetoric, the narrower its room for pragmatic maneuver. It simply risks ending up on the wrong side of history pushing outdated, disowned values as others around it turn to interests.

Canada faces a similar but different dilemma. Geography ties it tightly to the United States in trade, defense, and prosperity. Values-based narratives therefore come naturally because alternatives are limited. Yet as American politics becomes more transactional and unpredictable, it becomes harder to justify the relationship purely through claims of shared democratic virtue. Ottawa currently finds itself speaking the language of values while Washington speaks the language of leverage and interests. Much like Australia, it risks ending up on the wrong side of history pushing outdated, disowned values as others around it turn to interests.

South Korea is the middle power least suited to a purely values-based worldview. Its history was shaped by survival among competing great powers, not civilizational comfort. Seoul prospered through adaptation, ambiguity, and strategic flexibility: relying on the United States for security while integrating economically with China. The danger for South Korea is not simply entrapment between Washington and Beijing, but losing the pragmatic mindset that historically allowed it to survive systemic change. Leaning into values now (as many conservative protesters do) risks ending up on the wrong side of history pushing outdated, disowned values as others around it turn to interests.

So all three have one thing in common. They bought into the values-based rhetoric, but are now facing a challenge in letting it go—and they must let it go because it’s increasingly hollow as the U.S. itself reverts to interests-based relationships.

Values-based relationships were a luxury of a brief historical moment rather than a permanent feature of international politics.

When hegemony is stable, values are easy to proclaim. When power shifts, interests quickly return to the surface. Values still matter, but middle powers that confuse the rhetoric of international order with the mechanics of survival risk strategic paralysis. Historically, prosperity came less from moral absolutism than from adaptability and a clear understanding of national interests.

This brings us back to pizza. Values-based relationship are like arguing endlessly over which toppings are correct, authentic, or civilized. Interests-based relationships are much simpler: who’s hungry, who’s paying, and who’s still open.

In stability, middle powers can fluff on about values-based relationships like a stuffed academic debating pizza toppings. In harsher and more transactional world, middle powers have to focus on interests like a hungry academic writing late into the night—the soul interest is who still delivers.

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