South Korea's turn from NATO

South Korea’s NATO moment was not the beginning of a new global role. It was the final stage of an export strategy.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung will skip the NATO summit in The Hague, citing urgent economic concerns at home following the U.S. strike on Iran and rising oil prices. His absence, alongside those of the Japanese and Australian prime ministers, highlights that U.S. partners in the Indo-Pacific are wary of U.S. unpredictability under Trump, and are cooling toward the NATO-IP4 (Indo-Pacific Four, including Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand) framework.

Each state has their own rationales. South Korea has three: diplomatic timing, strategic delay; and the decreased relevance of NATO-IP4 framework.

First, diplomatic timing. Meeting President Trump for the first time at NATO would be ill-timed and risky. With war escalating in the Middle East and his political standing under pressure, Trump will enter the NATO summit volatile and demanding—conditions that make any bilateral engagement unpredictable. Trump is famously reactive under stress, and the optics of a sit-down with a hesitant ally could provoke a public rebuke or private ultimatum. For President Lee, who understands the delicacy required in managing Trump, the calculus is clear: it is better to wait than to walk into a room where frustration is high and tempers are short.