The fecklessness of Foreign Affairs

As the U.S. falters in its foreign policy, it’s only natural that its primary publication in the field becomes a catalogue of its own failures.

This month there’s three articles on the Korean Peninsula in Foreign Affairs - the primary publication of the U.S. foreign policy establishment. The articles say more about America than Korea.

For the past decade, read anything on Korea in Foreign Affairs and you’re almost guaranteed no surprises. This month, we’ve been fed three articles and three variations on a theme: one revisits why denuclearization failed—only to suggest continuing down essentially the same path; another profiles Kim Jong-un, with the now-standard anxiety about North Korea’s ties to Russia; and the third leans fully into it, framing Pyongyang’s links with Russia and China as the central threat.

At most, you get minor updates to reflect current events, but continuity is the real story: the same voices, the same morbid framing, the same think-tank waffle. It’s less analysis than a kind of retail cycle—old arguments taken off the shelf, lightly dusted, and put back out as if they were new.

You’d be hard pressed to find a clearer example of Washington’s abject failure on the Korean Peninsula than the shite that comes in these pages: a stale Cold War worldview that treats the U.S. as inherently just, trustworthy and reliable—all while effectively erasing South Korea from the picture.

South Korea barely exists in these articles. It appears as a staging ground, an ally, a variable to be managed. At best, it’s a “partner” whose role is to align, reassure, or be reassured. At worst, it disappears entirely, reduced to geography—terrain for U.S. strategy rather than a state with its own agency, interests, or evolving strategic outlook. That’s not an oversight. It’s the Washington thinktank wankery framework.

Washington’s analysis of the peninsula remains frozen in a Cold War mindset where the primary relationship is U.S.–North Korea, with China and Russia as supporting cast. South Korea is folded into the “alliance,” and the alliance is treated as synonymous with South Korean interests. That sleight of hand does most of the analytical work. It’s also why the analysis feels so stale.

Here’s the writing production line: (1) North Korea is growing more dangerous; (2) Its nuclear program has advanced; (3) Its ties with Russia and China are deepening and (4) The United States must adapt—slightly. Perhaps shift from denuclearization to arms control, and add a catchy phrase like “cold peace.” Voila. Foreign Affairs article done!

The United States remains the central actor. The problem remains North Korea. The solution remains some variation of U.S.-led management.

After thirty years of failure, this is presented not as an indictment, but as continuity.

Even when these pieces acknowledge failure, they do so in the safest possible way. Denuclearization didn’t work—but we should still aim for it. Sanctions hardened Pyongyang—but they remain the primary tool. Diplomacy failed—but only because it wasn’t done properly, consistently, or with enough buy-in.

Foreign Affairs is repackaging shite that shouldn’t have been put on the shelves in the first place.

Recycled anxiety about North Korea’s alignment with Russia and China—as if this is a new development rather than the predictable outcome of sustained U.S. pressure and isolation. As if Pyongyang would do anything else. As if the current configuration is an aberration rather than a logical equilibrium. After Trump’s diplomacy, what else could anyone expect?

The Trump administration didn’t just introduce unpredictability; it exposed something far more significant: the fragility of U.S. strategic consistency. One moment the peninsula was on the brink of “fire and fury,” the next it was the stage for summit diplomacy that achieved little beyond optics. Allies were reassured, then questioned, then transactionalized. Military exercises were halted, then resumed. Commitments became negotiable.

What this reveals—whether Washington likes it or not—is that the United States is not a stable anchor. It is a variable. A high risk variable.

And that matters far more to Seoul than another recycled discussion about North Korea’s missile inventory.

South Korea is not sitting still. Its strategic debates are widening: nuclear armament, strategic autonomy, recalibration of the alliance, even the long-unthinkable question of how to live with North Korea rather than transform it. These are not fringe ideas anymore—they are responses to a changing environment in which U.S. guarantees look less absolute (or even dangerous) and regional dynamics more fluid.

If South Korea’s interests begin to diverge—if stability on the peninsula requires something other than permanent confrontation, permanent deterrence, and permanent U.S. presence—then the entire analytical framework starts to crack. The alliance becomes a question rather than an assumption. U.S. strategy becomes a constraint rather than a solution.

And once you see that, the repetition in these articles makes sense.

They’re not really trying to understand the Korean Peninsula as it is. They’re trying to preserve a way of seeing it that keeps the United States at the centre.

The irony is that the more this perspective is repeated, the less useful it becomes. Not because North Korea is misunderstood—though it often is—but because the peninsula itself is changing faster than the analysis allows. South Korea is evolving. The regional balance is shifting. The credibility of U.S. commitments is no longer taken for granted.

At some point, this stops being analysis and starts becoming performance.

The Korean Peninsula doesn’t need another article explaining why denuclearization failed or why North Korea is dangerous.

In no way is it the fault of the authors themselves. Each is competent and skilled at what they do. The problem is they work within a system that doesn’t reward creativity, analysis, or insight. They’re just cogs within a machine that has been overworked and is now leaking and grinding as it putters to an end.

What we really need is a willingness to ask more difficult questions: what if the problem isn’t just North Korea? What if it’s the framework itself? What if the biggest obstacle to thinking clearly about the peninsula isn’t Pyongyang—but Washington?

In some ways, the fecklessness of Foreign Affairs is a sign of the times. As the U.S. falters in its foreign policy, it’s only natural that its primary publication in the field becomes a catalogue of its own failures.

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