The question is no longer whether the alliance will change, but who will make the first move: Washington pulling back from Korea, or Seoul asking the Americans to leave
A solid assessment but I would divide this prognosis by 2, as much as I respect the author. I think that, rather than out in the dusty street preparing to draw, the two parties are still standing at opposite ends of the bar over in the Long Branch, each eying the other, each deciding if a trip out to the street is necessary and, if so, will that face-off wait until they finish their respective drinks. The Alliance may or may not survive the two concurrent administrations and all will depend on which party first pushes forward the various issues now in play. America's increasing indifference (do we have an ambassador yet in place to "manage" the complex elements introduced by the Trump team, and when she finally does arrive and set up camp, will she have any chance of influencing positively the evolving relationship?), when coupled with the inability of the two sides to resolve differences big and small, will set the tempo for a decision, and possibly compel a US "adjustment". There are so may compelling reasons to stay the course, make adjustments, compromise on respective demands, but the jury is out. Miss Kitty (apologies for the "Gunsmoke" references) is not taking any bets.
The Pen will forever remain The Pen fenced off from nearby regional contingencies, because Truman's wisdom of silofying Taiwan strait and Korean peninsula remains valid today: US is unprepared and unwilling for a large land war in Asia
"Washington worries Seoul no longer shares American strategic priorities. South Korea does not want to fight a U.S.-China war over Taiwan"
-> needs to be changed to "Washington forces unresolved Taiwan contingencies upon Seoul (and Tokyo), demanding commitment to an American-led conflict that the U.S. itself remains deeply undecided on"
Lingering in the NEAsian frontier was never a winning strategy remaining stationary in these frontiers is and continues to be a slow death sentence. The solution was always reaching for the imperial core or die trying.
Successful barbarians:
Xianbei. Khitan. Tangut. Jurchen. Mongol. Manchu. They achieved centuries of demographic boom, geographic security, and immense wealth extraction simply not possible in their homelands.
Unsuccessful barbarians:
Di people, Sogdian people, Xiongnu, Japanese. Minus the Japanese (thanks to their massive Home Islands) they all went extinct. Even Japan spent 3 centuries to recover from Imjin War devastation; now it is unable to escape decades of stagnation.
Rhee and Chiang's belief was that US (if US wanted to keep that regional hegemony permanent!) would be willing to fund their crusades against Communism. Both have their faults but I feel confident in saying **their strategic views of what US needs to do, based on East Asian history of hegemony, is historically valid.** We are now witnessing the blowback from that permanent rollback mentality
A solid assessment but I would divide this prognosis by 2, as much as I respect the author. I think that, rather than out in the dusty street preparing to draw, the two parties are still standing at opposite ends of the bar over in the Long Branch, each eying the other, each deciding if a trip out to the street is necessary and, if so, will that face-off wait until they finish their respective drinks. The Alliance may or may not survive the two concurrent administrations and all will depend on which party first pushes forward the various issues now in play. America's increasing indifference (do we have an ambassador yet in place to "manage" the complex elements introduced by the Trump team, and when she finally does arrive and set up camp, will she have any chance of influencing positively the evolving relationship?), when coupled with the inability of the two sides to resolve differences big and small, will set the tempo for a decision, and possibly compel a US "adjustment". There are so may compelling reasons to stay the course, make adjustments, compromise on respective demands, but the jury is out. Miss Kitty (apologies for the "Gunsmoke" references) is not taking any bets.
I’m just loving it that someone took on the cowboy film framing and ran with it! Very very nice!!!
The Pen will forever remain The Pen fenced off from nearby regional contingencies, because Truman's wisdom of silofying Taiwan strait and Korean peninsula remains valid today: US is unprepared and unwilling for a large land war in Asia
"Washington worries Seoul no longer shares American strategic priorities. South Korea does not want to fight a U.S.-China war over Taiwan"
-> needs to be changed to "Washington forces unresolved Taiwan contingencies upon Seoul (and Tokyo), demanding commitment to an American-led conflict that the U.S. itself remains deeply undecided on"
Lingering in the NEAsian frontier was never a winning strategy remaining stationary in these frontiers is and continues to be a slow death sentence. The solution was always reaching for the imperial core or die trying.
Successful barbarians:
Xianbei. Khitan. Tangut. Jurchen. Mongol. Manchu. They achieved centuries of demographic boom, geographic security, and immense wealth extraction simply not possible in their homelands.
Unsuccessful barbarians:
Di people, Sogdian people, Xiongnu, Japanese. Minus the Japanese (thanks to their massive Home Islands) they all went extinct. Even Japan spent 3 centuries to recover from Imjin War devastation; now it is unable to escape decades of stagnation.
Rhee and Chiang's belief was that US (if US wanted to keep that regional hegemony permanent!) would be willing to fund their crusades against Communism. Both have their faults but I feel confident in saying **their strategic views of what US needs to do, based on East Asian history of hegemony, is historically valid.** We are now witnessing the blowback from that permanent rollback mentality