The use of nuclear weapons against Iran

When you have leaders like this, nuclear use is not a breakdown of logic—but its culmination

In Western culture, nuclear weapons are often considered unusable—a taboo embedded over decades in public consciousness. But taboos are not fixed. Like other norms, they erode under pressure. The willingness of the Trump Administration to openly sideline international law and international norms suggest that constraints once thought firm are now conditional.

It is only a short step further to accept the use of nuclear weapons.

Deterrence theory always posited that nuclear weapons are not unusable; they are conditionally usable. Their purpose is to impose catastrophic risk—and they become viable when three conditions converge: existential loss, failing conventional options, and shrinking time. Under these pressures, nuclear weapons shift from deterrent to last resort—not necessarily to win, but to prevent what is perceived as an intolerable outcome.

What, then, constitutes an intolerable outcome for Israel and the United States?

In considering this, it is important to think not in the context of values (how or why the war started), but rather the current situation and what the trajectory suggests is the worst case outcome. Scarily, both Israel and the U.S. fit within the framework for nuclear first use.

Israel’s nuclear posture was once tied to survival. Since securing conventional dominance within the region, its nuclear posture transformed to regional domination. The emergence of Iran as a regional competitor that can both punish Israel and restrict U.S. action in the region reset Israeli calculations. A worst case outcome leaves Israel unable to decisively weaken Iran through conventional means, and unable to rely on the U.S. for support (see below).

In this case, delay does not stabilise the environment; it shifts the balance. Israel faces a closing strategic window that it may believe is a threat to its survival.

Nuclear use, in this logic, would not be about battlefield outcomes but about resetting that trajectory—imposing costs so severe that the emerging regional order is disrupted before it consolidates. It is a logic of pre-emption at the highest level of escalation.

The United States operates on a different scale, but the underlying reasoning converges. Its concern is not immediate survival, but systemic position.

The U.S. focuses on three regions: Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. The Middle East is a critical segment of the broader strategic rimland that underpins U.S. global influence. Losing effective control over it would reverberate through energy markets, alliance structures, and perceptions of American reliability.

A regional loss will cascade—undermine credibility in other theatres and accelerate challenges from peer competitors. It would weaken and potentially lead to U.S. departure from both Europe and East Asia. Nuclear use would effectively be seen as a means of halting sudden and precipitous decline. Again, it is a logic of pre-emption at the highest level of escalation.

Compounding this structural logic are political conditions that heighten risk.

• First, both administrations have dehumanized their opponents, narrowing the space for restraint.

• Second, both are morally compromised, subordinating values to expediency. If you’ll bomb schools, you’ll use nukes.

• Third, both show an inability to signal clearly, coupled with a tendency toward deception—raising the risk of miscalculation.

• Fourth, Israel has demonstrated an ability to shape U.S. decision-making in ways that do not clearly align with American national interests. Striking Iran was not in U.S. interests. Paradoxically, escalation and nuclear use now brings the debacle more into line with U.S. national interests.

• Fifth, both states are supported by largely weak, compromised, and compliant political classes, lacking the leadership and strategic awareness necessary to recognize and resist escalation risks.

The danger lies precisely here. Nuclear use emerges from coherent, internally consistent reasoning under extreme pressure. If Israel sees a closing window and the United States sees cascading decline, both may conclude that the costs of inaction exceed the risks of escalation.

The war was launched on a shifting, inadequate frame: Iran seeks nuclear weapons, sponsors terror, and its people want regime change then became about oil and the Straits of Hormuz. It began without strategy, preparation, public support, or allied consultation. In such conditions, nuclear use is not a breakdown of logic—but its culmination.