What’s in store for middle powers on the wrong side of history?

If we accept the Iran case as a lesson, what’s in store for middle powers on the wrong side of history is at least three generations of suffering.

Imagine a future East Asia where U.S. influence has waned. Its regional military commitments wound back, its political influence hollowed out, and its interest in playing a regional role curtailed to silent support without placing itself at a disadvantage in its broader global interests. What happens to regional middle powers that for one reason or another, do not adapt to the new balance?

Well, the Iran conflict and the history behind it gives us a guide. Yes, that Iran - a middle power on the wrong side of history.

First, let’s do away with the argument that Iran is not a middle power like Australia, Canada, or South Korea. Indeed, Iran fits all the three flawed early definitions of what constitutes a middle power. It is a middle power in functional, capacity, and behavioral terms.

Functional definitions define middle powers by the roles they perform in international politics, such as maintaining regional stability or supporting global governance. Iran fits a functional definition of a middle power through its role as the centre of Shi’a Islam and its influence across Shi’a religious and political networks in the Middle East and South Asia. It also functions as a strategic and civilizational bridge linking the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia through its geography, trade routes, and Persian cultural connections.

Capacity definitions define middle powers according to measurable capabilities such as economic size, military strength, or industrial capacity. Under a capacity definition, Iran can be considered a middle power due to its substantial population, large military, major energy reserves, and significant regional influence. Iran possesses one of the largest armed forces and missile arsenals in the Middle East, major oil and gas reserves, and the capacity to project influence across the region through both conventional and asymmetric means.

Behavioral definitions define middle powers through characteristic diplomatic behaviour, including active diplomacy, niche diplomacy, coalition-building,
and “good international citizenship.” Iran maintained extensive diplomatic engagement across the Middle East and beyond, building strategic relationships with states such as Syria, Russia, and China while cultivating networks with non-state actors and regional movements aligned with its interests.

Iran demonstrated niche diplomacy through areas where it has developed distinctive influence, including Shi’a religious networks, energy diplomacy, missile and security cooperation, and its role in regional transit and connectivity corridors linking the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia. Through organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Iran presents itself as supporting multilateralism, regional autonomy, and resistance to hegemonic domination.

Arguably, it even demonstrated “good international citizenship” in its support for Palestinians and for families of Palestinians killed, injured, or imprisoned in the conflict with Israel and in its support for the Palestinian cause and regional resistance movements. Within its discourse, such support is a form of international responsibility and solidarity with allied populations and movements in the region, equating to similar efforts of Australia and Canada within their own frames of discourse (supporting peacekeeping or international efforts to restore liberal-international order).

So Iran is indeed a middle power - and for anyone washed in the sewered waterways of Western media, we also know that it was on the “wrong side of history”.

Iran was, for all intents of purposes, a middle power struggling against the hegemonic order. How did it fare?

In 1953 U.S and U.K supported overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. That was a blow to the livelihoods of its populace, because from all accounts, the Shah and his regime were not hesitant to employ the CIA-trained Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar or SAVAK for routine surveillance, censorship, torture, repression of political opposition, and murder. Ordinary Iranians suffered because of interventions seeking to support the hegemonic power.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah, American and British (and increasingly Israeli) support evolved into sustained economic and political pressure aimed at weakening and containing the Iranian state. The U.S. encouraged and pushed hostilities between Iran and neighboring Iraq, until open hostilities took off. For eight long years (1980–1988), the U.S. supported Iraq through intelligence sharing, economic assistance, and diplomatic backing as part of its effort to contain Iran.

U.S. sanctions on Iran began in November 1979 when U.S. President Carter froze billions of dollars in Iranian assets and imposed trade restrictions. Since then, sanctions targeted oil exports, banking, shipping, and access to global finance, which severely damaged the economy, weakened the currency, fueled inflation, and contributed to shortages of imported goods and medicines. Ordinary Iranians experienced declining living standards, rising unemployment, and increasing economic insecurity.

Alongside sanctions came covert and hybrid efforts to undermine internal stability. The U.S/U.K/Israel conducted sabotage operations, cyberattacks, assassinations, and attacks on military and nuclear infrastructure. They funded Persian-language broadcasting, opposition-linked media ecosystems, democracy-promotion initiatives, and supported exile political networks to weaken the state. They cultivated unrest, pushed for a “color revolution,” and armed protesters, until finally the U.S. and Israel took it to the next level with a pointless war beginning with the assassination of the nation’s leaders and the murder of more than 160 school children.

Needless to say, Iran did not fare well as a lone middle power struggling against the hegemonic order - which brings us back to the future East Asia where American military and political influence has faded.

China will be the hegemonic power in East Asia. Will it act any differently from the U.S. with a regional middle power that does not adapt to the new balance?

Many Westerners like to demonize China and imagine their own system as more civilizedIt was after all, the “benign hegemony” of “Pax Americana”. Iran’s perspective tells us otherwise. Just as Orwell has been often adapted to “All victims are equal. None are more equal than others” middle powers should remember “All hegemons are equal, none are more evil than others.” Being a regional middle power on the wrong side of history has never been easy, and will not be easy in the future.

If we accept the Iran case as a lesson, what’s in store for middle powers on the wrong side of history is at least three generations of suffering. Three generations of political repression, economic privation, and war!

This begs the question: Is it better for a middle power to act early to adapt and acquiesce to the regional hegemon or is it better to struggle, suffer, and fight against the odds? It’s a difficult question—one bound up with sovereignty, culture, history, capacity, political leadership, and national character. At some point of time in the not too distant future, the people of South Korea, Australia and Canada may face that very question: adapt or struggle?

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